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Abstract: How do we understand links between sufism and pro-egalitarian 
revolutionary activism in the early twentieth century; and how did upland compositions 
of self and community help constitute revolutionary activism in South Asia more 
broadly? Using Pashto poetry as my archive I integrate a history of radical egalitarian 
thought and political practice to a holistic study of self-making; of imperial spatiality; 
and of shifting gradients of power in the regions between Kabul and Punjab. Amid a 
chaotic rise of new practices of imperial and monarchic hegemony around the turn of 
the twentieth century, I argue, older sedimentations of ‘devotee selfhood’ in the high 
valleys of eastern Afghanistan gave rise, in social spaces preserved by self-reflexive 
poetic practice and circulation, to conscious desires for avoidance of all forms of 
hierarchy or sovereignty, in favour of a horizontal politics of reciprocity. Such inchoate 
drives for freedom later played a role in constituting anti-statist revolutionary 
subjectivities across great geographical and social distance. From upland sufi roots they 
rippled outward to intersect with the work of transnational socialist and anti-imperialist 
militants in Indian nationalist circles too; and even influenced scholars at the heart of 
the nascent Afghan nation-state.
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Introduction
The most prominent communist organiser in British India’s Northwest Frontier 
Province in the 1930s and 40s was ‘Abd al-Rahim Popalzai, mufti (legal authority) of 
Peshawar and a Deoband graduate. Contrary to claims that there was little ‘Islamic’ in 
his political commitments,1Popalzai narrated his activism in terms of piety and of sufi 
cosmology, citing his acute awareness of wahdat al-wujud, the unity of all being; and 
the implications of this unity for the individual self and for social responsibility. He also
cited dream-apparitions by the Sahib of Hadda, an activist saint of the border region.2
3Likewise, Sulayman Layiq, a renowned poet, Politburo member, and Afghan Minister of
Culture in the communist 1980s, traces his specific politics to internationalism; but in 
examining his own activist impulse, he cites his childhood on the Indo-Afghan border in
a pastoralist mulla family who were embedded in activist devotional networks.3 
How do we understand the links between revolutionary affect and borderland 
Islam that occur so frequently in activist narratives of the period? English-language 
research involving the frontier has often split cosmopolitan genealogies of the left from 
‘Muslim identity politics’.4 Urdu-language historiography has more often located ideas 
of social justice in lineages of reformist Islam.5 But both bodies of research focus on 
how elites brought cosmopolitan ideas like pan-Islam, reformism, or socialism to the 
frontier. Like imperial anxiety over ‘Wahhabis’ and ‘Bolshevik’ agents,6 they depend on 
ideas of a static frontier, in which social change results mostly from outside dynamism. 
Finally, in contrast to the above, more recent work has argued that militancy in 
the Indo-Afghan borderland is better understood contextually, especially in terms of 
structures of inequality in local and global political economy. This includes the 
figuration of the imperial frontier as a regional and global frontier in the first instance. 
This focus is exemplified by a number of selections in Magnus Marsden and Ben 
Hopkins’ 2012 volume Beyond Swat, and has been influenced by debates over class and 
regional dynamics in the rise of post-2001 Taliban movements. This line of 
argumentation has had more sociological nuance, and attention to spatiality and power 
begins to raise the question of why Deobandi activism in the Frontier, for example, 
resulted in large-scale radical counterorganization, rather than movements of 
individualized self-help and personal piety as in the north Indian plains. I build on this 
line of argumentation here.
4But, such framing can risk reinscribing the very notions of centre and periphery 
that underlay the structures it critiques. And, even recent research has prioritised modern
ideation-centred notions of activism; whereas even the brief account of Popalzai above, 
with his dream-devotion and his sensitivity to constitutions of selfhood by a broader 
cosmos, suggests subtler combinations of reflexive thought and interpersonal emotional 
geographies. So can we move away from marginalising accounts of ‘frontier leftism,’ 
toward one that centres upland space; and one that is as sensitive to indigenous modes 
of understanding action as it is to self-universalising concepts like ‘socialism’? 
This essay forms a bottom-up complement to Yasmin Saikia’s discussion, in this
collection, of actors between global and local worlds. In it, I integrate a history of 
radical egalitarian thought and political practice to a holistic study of selfhood; of 
spatiality; and of shifting gradients of power in the regions between Kabul and Punjab. 
In the first half, I retell histories of sufi militancy on the frontier from a 
devotee’s perspective, to read ‘sufism’ in terms of individual and collective technologies
of self-making. Mutuality in agrarian ritual was inseparable from modes of devotion 
that emphasised social concern and social levelling; while pilgrimage routes, scholarly 
networks, and the circulation of sufi poetic techniques of self-creation that they fostered,
linked individual devotion and local agrarian practices to wider domains. Post-1870s 
extensions of new forms of sovereignty fractured these worlds suddenly, superimposing 
multiple hierarchies of tribe and sufi lineage onto them. But amid a chaotic rise of new 
forms of hegemony, I argue, older sedimentations of ‘devotee selfhood’ gave rise, in 
social spaces preserved by self-reflexive poetic practice and circulation, to conscious 
desires for avoidance of all hierarchy in favour of a horizontal politics of reciprocity. 
Such inchoate drives for freedom later played a role in constituting revolutionary
subjectivities across great geographical and social distance. Local Afghan devotional 
5worlds and mobile peoples formed a lattice of connected space in Certeau’s sense, a 
“polyvalent unity of...contractual proximities” from the highlands to the Indian plain, 
produced by cumulative devotional use.7 Upland histories were intimately connected to 
the wider world. So, once we re-centre upland ontologies we should also ask: how did 
mountain histories shape wider politics? In this essay’s second half, I explore the lives 
of upland history not as counterpoint to better-known channels of activism, but as a 
neglected presence within them. Of course, if elite activists like Popalzai narrate 
mountain sufi roots, one might dismiss this as a bid for legitimacy; but I contend there is
more to it. I argue that rhetoric of non-state sovereignty at the 1920s Afghan court is not
explainable only by court intellectuals’ often-cited European and Turkish advisers. I 
argue the same regarding the activism of World War I-era cross-border leftist scholars. I 
do not dismiss the impact of cosmopolitan genealogies, but I argue that the dynamism 
of older devotional worlds and new activism together posited new radical alternatives.
I begin tracing these milieus through one of the few non-elite archives we have 
on early twentieth century Afghanistan’s eastern uplands: Pashto selections from an oral
corpus of songs in Pashai, Pashto, Urdu, and Persian attributed to Muhammad Nur (b. 
1864), a tenant farmer from the Alingar valley. In the next section I describe how power,
operating in society and within subjects, constituted the borderland in the late nineteenth
century. But Muhammad Nur’s decentralised poetic landscapes, in the section after that,
were other parallel worlds. These nurtured their own dynamic critical resources: indeed,
the reflexivity in Muhammad Nur’s songs and in his oral history provides the 
interpretive frame for my account here. 
I: Sovereignty and Territory
By the 1880s, as with imperial frontiers across the world in this period, British 
technologies of rule fragmented and encapsulated populations on both sides of the Indo-
6Afghan border. Starting in the 1850s, bureaucratic authoritarianism in the newly-
annexed frontier gradually institutionalised the violence of a colonial state as it 
expanded, in a manner similar to the way it did in Punjab of which it was originally 
part: formalisation of landed elites’ customary law; individualised policing; land 
revenue settlements. As Robert Nichols has traced, over the next half-century, practices 
of managing frontier security gradually differentiated the irrigated, revenue-producing 
trans-Indus districts from the less accessible borderland, with the former paying the 
expenses of garrisoning the empire against, largely, the latter.8 The Settled Districts were
formally split from Punjab in 1901 to form the North-West Frontier Province [NWFP]. 
The border areas were grouped into Tribal Agencies. 
As Maira Hayat argues, this mode of indirect control accentuated the political 
salience of tribe and locality, through policies that saw lineages as collective agents and 
gave them stakes in acting as such.9 Tribal subsidies were disbursed through Political 
Agents to hand-picked elders, who received places on ‘tribal councils’ in exchange for 
preventing cross-border crime into ‘Settled’ territory. Mobility, including trade, did not 
end but was newly disciplined. At the same time the colonial state disavowed 
governance in the Agencies but, building on Criminal Tribes legislation that allowed 
suspension of legal process, the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation formalised collective 
punishment, including punitive military operations that punctuate the region’s history 
even now. Neither inside nor outside the state, border residents were subject to violence 
by a distant imperial army; while a new intensification of lineage patriarchy and 
seniority was the local face of outsourced rule, by a colonial state that still claimed 
sovereign rights over life. In response to all this fragmentation, Pashto folklore shows a 
sharp rise in attention, from about 1900 to 1925, to transgressive self-formation: tales of
7hyper-individuals who transcend administrative boundaries, economy, elders, tribe, even
sometimes gender, through morally complex ‘criminal’ agency.10
Figure 1. The border region. Laghman consists of two valleys merging at Mihtarlam north of the Jalalabad plain: Alishing
to the northwest and Alingar to the northeast. Nuristan starts in upper Alingar, in the centre top of this map.
Afghan rule too was consolidated through modalities of inclusion and exclusion that 
were personalised and tribalised, backed by military force. As Christine Noelle argues, 
the Amir Sher ‘Ali (r. 1863-1879) dismantled intermediary power between regional 
potentates and the state, and many local khans, or power brokers, came into direct 
negotiation with the centre.11 His successor Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman (r. 1880-1901) 
eliminated all competitors with the help of a substantial annual subsidy from British 
India, paid in exchange for imperial control over Afghanistan’s foreign affairs and a 
new definition of the border. ‘Abd al-Rahman incorporated select lineages’ status to the 
state in numerous ways, up to and including the marriage of his son Habibullah to the 
8daughter of the Mohmand Khan of Lalpura on the Indo-Afghan border; and he relied on
powerful valley tribes’ collective support in disciplining their upland cousins and 
regulating mobility.12 Elsewhere the Amir underscored sovereignty by bringing military 
force to bear on cases of exception: for instance, Hazarajat’s independent Shi‘i elites 
were crushed and thousands of Hazaras were deported in bondage to Kabul. 
The Alingar valley, today straddling Laghman and Nuristan provinces, shows 
how the incorporations and exclusions of new absolute sovereignty worked with local 
initiative. The upper Alingar was populated by animist tribes as were a number of 
valleys to the east, all of which were converted in 1896 by the Amir’s army. But this 
was preceded by violent incursions led by Mulla Khalil Mohmand; ‘Umra Khan who 
formed a khanate across the border;13 and other entrepreneurs, not tied to the state but 
extending modes of quasi-state patriarchy that mirrored empire’s local borderland face. 
This paved the way for monarchic power, and indeed the monarchy sponsored similar 
trends: ‘Abd al-Rahman’s successor Habibullah (r. 1901-1919) brought a descendent of 
the Qadiri sufi order’s twelfth-century founder, ‘Abd al-Qadir Gilani, from Iraq to settle 
in Afghanistan in 1905,14 granting him trade concessions and tax-free land. This ‘Naqib’
set up court outside Jalalabad, establishing himself as the authoritative pir, or saint. He 
built stratified webs of Qadiri politics that exerted significant power in the countryside. 
As Azfar Moin argues, vocabularies of sovereignty were mutually-constitutive with sufi 
lineage as it developed in early modern South Asia.15 Michel Boivin too highlights 
‘languages of domination’ in local South Asian sufism, in which devotional centres 
were phrased as ‘courts’: reinforcing idioms of central authority even if the order was 
mostly autonomous.16 Is not the act of concentrating authority at the apex of hierarchic 
lineage, whether in a pir or in the khan-khel (power lineage) of tribes, a way to reinforce
sovereignty in principle, internalising patterns of hierarchy in individual subjects?
9Finally, the emergent Qadiri network counterbalanced other saintly-scholarly 
networks, like that centred on Saydu Baba (1793-1878) of Swat. This network spread 
through webs of allegiance among enterprising scholar-saints in the late nineteenth 
century, in spaces across north-western British India, the princely state of Swat, the 
Tribal Agencies, and Afghanistan as far as Ghazni.17 The insurgent mulla Mushk-i 
‘Alam represented the network there in the 1870s, and his disciple Najm al-Din ‘Sahib 
of Hadda’ (d. 1903) took up the mantle in the 1880s. The Sahib’s residence at Hadda, 
south of Jalalabad, supported a scholarly khanaqah (hospice) and a political-moral 
economy centred on his communal kitchen, or langar. It is to this saint, the same Sahib 
of Hadda who appeared in dreams to Peshawar’s socialist scholarPopalzai, that several 
songs by the oral poet Muhammad Nur of Laghman are dedicated, including one we 
will read in the next section. The Sahib is more fractured a figure than Gilani, even as 
the militancy of his khalifas, or local deputies, made his networks the most important 
frontier political phenomenon of their time.18 Colonial archives see him as a sometime-
ally of the Amir.19 He earned his own authority as a miracle worker and a scholar too. 
And, ordinary devotees like Muhammad Nur, the subject of the next section, remade the
Sahib as a devotee-centric institution, through modes of community that undermined all 
the territory described above.
II: Other Geographies, and Devotional Subjects, ca. 1900
The following elegy for the Sahib of Hadda dates to after the Sahib’s 1903 death. It 
speaks of militancy but does not centre it, or even elite saintly agency. It narrates a 
miracle in which imperial designs were averted through nothing more than a gathering 
of devotees harvesting the crops at Hadda to fuel the langar, or community kitchen. It 
may refer to any of many expeditions against Hadda’s networks, over the early 1900s:
1[Refrain] His langar operates continuously; all the officers (afsar) flock to it
Hadda Sahib is a wali (miraculous saint) and has many colorful faqirs (anonymous 
devotees)
 * * *
Hadda Sahib, Your wali, lies there in Hindustan 
Wherever I look, I see people laid out in grief 
His langar is running well, and believers gather to it
The Friday prayer is up and running; it’s a poor man’s pilgrimage to Mecca 
[Ref.][...]
Hadda Sahib, Your wali, lies there in Bajaur
He was constantly at the ghaza (holy war), he put the infidels to shame
His little court was in Tora Bora, like a clover field in the arid wilderness
His mullas all gathered there and cultivated his little court as a field 
[Ref.]
Now, Hadda Sahib passed away, and the British army came to know 
They leaped for joy, those buggerers were so happy
Thinking “The country has been left to us, in expectation of the harvest,
And in Hadda, in the gateway to the Khyber, the space is clear!” 
[Ref.] 
But [everyone] sat down in Hadda, and the British began to tremble
The British had to keep themselves in pardah [i.e. hidden and immobile]
They continued going around always wounded and afflicted
Saying, “Because of this faqir, we are still thrown off-balance!” 
[Ref.] [...]
May Muhammad Nur compose a poem through the prayers of good people
In his heart there is always a tidy sum of devoted lovers
Lord, may You count me among his servants
You Yourself are familiar with the state of Muhammad Nur the faqir.
[Ref.]: His langar operates continuously; all the officers flock to it
Hadda Sahib is a wali, and has many colorful faqirs20
The central story is a miracle attached to the Sahib but the focus is not on saintly 
heroism. The theme, established by the refrain about the langar, is two-fold: the 
Sahib’s link to ordinary people through the langar, and the collective power of his 
community who donate their labour to it. The latter recalls a harvest practice of 
mutual labour called ashar in which tenants and small-holder families, the majority 
of the highland population, helped reap each other’s crops. Here devotional 
sociability infuses it with meaning and power and magnifies its scope. In 
referencing all the various lands where the Sahib’s faqirs are active, the song 
emphasises a pluricentric geography spanning India and Afghanistan that the 
Sahib’s memory organises for believers. And this enchanted geography defends 
itself when devotees embody it at the harvest for the langar. Through their 
11
collective mutual service, an expeditionary force is coincidentally intimidated into 
retreating. British mobility is restricted; empire is reduced to garrison, a transient 
violence imposed on a resilient landscape. Both the miracle and the agency here lie 
in the conscious maintenance, and hence the resilience, of community-space.
This view of sainthood evokes the living power of decentralised geographies 
much larger and older than Muhammad Nur, in which the vertical lines of the state, its 
allies, and hierarchic sufism were far from the only salient channels of culture. Buddhist
rock inscriptions in Aramaic attest that the lower reaches of Muhammad Nur’s Laghman
were a space where transregional ideoscapes had always overlapped, while Islam and 
Afghan cultural expansion arrived in upper Laghman in the sixteenth century. This only 
added to a complex heterogeneity. Animist spirit veneration persisted in upper Laghman
into the 1890s. Upland languages like Pashai continue to be spoken, while interregional 
trade links made Pashto a lingua franca of trade, regional politics, and Islam. Today 
Pashto-speaking farmers, traders, and migrant labourers own land throughout Laghman 
alongside Pashai families of landowners, herders, sharecroppers, labourers, and artisans.
These groups formed Muhammad Nur’s public.
Religious life linked locality to movement too, often on locality’s own terms. 
The mythohistory Sifatnama-yi Ghazi Muhammad Darwesh, on the Islamisation of 
Laghman, indicates that Islam from the plains adapted to the high valleys’ sacred 
practices since the 1500s.21 The Sifatnama’s extant manuscript dates to the nineteenth 
century and the text was transmitted orally for some time prior to that, but its editor 
Scarcia believes that its original written text dates to the sixteenth century. Sifatnama, 
then, is best seen as a text in which discourses from earlier waves of conversion sat in 
dialogue with ongoing action; and the process described is not only one of erasure. 
1When read alongside reconstructions of pre-Islamic life like Klimburg’s work on the 
Laghman Ashkun, ethnographic traces in the Sifatnama, such as the remembering of 
pre-Islamic community tutelary deities in the names of Pashai villages, suggest that pre-
Islamic collective harvest of clan-god lands held ritual community-sustaining meaning--
prefiguring the significance of the Sahib’s collective ashar harvest?22 
Such practices were situated in a wider world of ancestor shrines and other sites 
that were gradually rededicated as memorials to fictive Muslim ghazi babas, or 
legendary holy warriors.  Devotees identified these anonymous saints with Qadiri 
sufism, while devotees’ mobile lives interlinked ghazi geographies and even extended 
them in processes that continued in the modern period: Muhammad Nur’s own family 
moved to the village Ghaziabad in Laghman’s Alishing valley, then relocated again to a 
new hamlet, Sultan Ghazi Baba, that grew on the outskirts of the valleys’ shared town, 
Mihtarlam.23 From there, these circuits linked into others of the Jalalabad plain, where 
eleventh-century ghazi baba domes succeed Hindu sites. 
Was it these very same decentralised Qadiri geographies that the Amir hoped to 
discipline by importing Qadiri authority from Iraq? Perhaps, but new extensions of 
hierarchy were in no way totalising. The monarchy both attacked and co-opted networks
but, as I argue in the rest of this section, along with the mobility of pilgrimage and trade,
mobile landscapes suffused with supernatural power remained in the virtual world of 
devotional texts and their circulation. This undercut attempts to introduce personalised 
monistic religious authority to populations who were accustomed to pluricentric practice
since before Islam, and undercut new practices of tribal authority that provided 
monarchy with local negotiating partners. Local landscapes opened into wider circuits 
in eastern Afghanistan and adjoining regions. Sayyid and miyan trader-scholar-saint 
families from outside the region had acculturated to it, and alongside Arabic and Persian
1texts they preserved transcendental Pashto knowledge in poetic forms like manaqib, or 
hagiographical songs, that were part of wider Persianate tradition. Tazkiras, or 
biographical dictionaries, tell of ‘ulama’s engagements with transregional semiology 
traditions; while versified sermons in the same sources speak to their composition of 
didactic poetry for lay people in Pashto folk genres. And so poetry was a leading site of 
a two-way traffic between the local and the transregional. Some sources speak of poets’ 
and ‘ulama’s overlapping professional fields, while the popular epithet ‘Haji’ (pilgrim) 
for subaltern poets registers both a transcendent power of poetic speech and a 
translocality to these fields. In an early twentieth century sermon on sin by Mulla Haji 
Gul, a scholar of the Jalalabad plain, we hear:
Students spend time with me too; where they form musical factions
They all call me ‘Haji’; people should note these facts
My enemies, and outsiders, flee everywhere I go, in awe [because of my power]
I ask them for a poet’s patronage (qalang); they give me authority, like a master 24
From these circuits, students moved into better-studied, more elite scholarly-sufi-
commercial networks that arose in the eighteenth century between Delhi and Bukhara to
become among the most important unifying factors of a politically decentralised zone, 
networks that forthcoming work by Waleed Ziad explores; and into newer Deobandi 
educational webs as well.25 
Returning to oral poets like Muhammad Nur: local worlds nourished powerful 
networks and their institutions, and non-elites tried to carve out autonomy in these 
networks, as the Hadda case shows. But also, some saints coalesced through literary 
participation alone, not through allegiance networks; and this was not merely an issue of
space, but of space-making technologies that were also technologies of self-making. 
The subaltern perspective that the Sahib of Hadda is but the sum of his devotees finds 
parallel in existing practices of saintly poetic co-authorship and co-authority. Tawakkul, 
1a poet who lived a generation before Muhammad Nur, also moved across circuits of 
anonymous Qadiri shrines in lower Kunar, east of Laghman.26 He survives as Tawakkul 
‘Baba’, a saint in his own right, and songs attributed to him are still occasionally 
composed today: anyone can ‘sign’ a song with ‘Tawakkul’s’ authorship if it articulates 
sentiments that fit the saint’s evolving persona.27 As Parita Mukta argues with regard to 
the better-studied Mira tradition in India, speaking in a saint’s persona involves partial 
assimilation of the devotee’s selfhood to new subject-positions: part of the devotee’s 
agentive self is realised as, or ‘becoming-in’, Tawakkul.28
 This kind of saint is a hub: both an agent and a collective subject. Couplets 
from many songs allude to this:
I meekly submit; I ask for peace! If I was Hindu, just consider me Muslim
So don’t kill me, O strong one! Let’s meander leisurely together on the road
Or:
Tawakkul’s poetry circulates as devotees’ prayers
Those who came to take part, set out on the road for this goal  29
The first is from a song that is a variation on a trope common in South Asian devotional 
poetry: a non-Muslim professional poet faces off against a Muslim one in a village 
competition, the usual way poets and their retinues earned patronage. In Pashto versions
like this, the weaker party, the non-Muslim, often emerges victorious through superior 
wit.30 Tawakkul’s variation subverts an antagonistic idea of victory, calling attention to 
the violence of the encounter but then harmonising his opponent’s voice onto his 
“road”. The second couplet is also a common trope: collective sainthood was conscious 
and reflexive, and songs constantly allude to it. The first couplet’s “meandering-
together” would easily be understood as an allegory for wider practices of collaborative 
circulation; and its subversion of violence, a collective statement on alternative politics. 
1These assimilations spread to interregional scales. One 1880s Orientalist called 
Tawakkul “one of the century’s most famous [Afghan] poets”,31 while a celebrated 
1880s poet named Mira, whose songs were collected among peddlers as far from his 
Khyber homeland as the Deccan, paid tribute to Tawakkul in song, placing himself as 
Tawakkul’s ‘prime minister’: an indication, part parody and part not, that poetic 
networks formed an alterpolitical space in people’s awarenesses?32In any event, besides 
the Pashto songs, there exist poems attributed to Tawakkul in Persian and Urdu, and in 
Pashai. Pashai poetry locates Tawakkul, and Muhammad Nur, in a very specific set of 
valleys, but a merging of Urdu into their corpuses through co-authorship tied the high 
valleys into mobile Afghan society: the interregional world of entrepreneurs who 
worked the entire Indian subcontinent, and the colonial globality of Pashtun labourers. 
Finally, interregional poetic circulation returned to remake institutions of local 
authority. In life, professional poets could not avoid local power. They typically 
performed in hujras: the men’s lodges that local notables or lineages kept as public 
space and as lodging for travellers and for workers during harvest. Based on sources 
like Darmesteter’s monumental 1888 compendium of oral poetry, Chants populaires 
des Afghans, poets of the period sang love songs, and elite-centred narratives about 
monarchy, empire, and local notables. But while Tawakkul and, later, Muhammad Nur 
sang such genres too, both are famous for didactic songs that infused transcendent 
discourse into this temporal space. Such genres and personae, and the publics who sang 
them, assimilated the power of elite patronage, regional scholarship, and saintly power 
to transcend all three. Afghan folklorists note they were performed at the start of 
gatherings as illocution, temporarily making the men’s lodge into a space where plural 
perspectives were speakable whether they supported local power or not.33 Returning to 
the point: interregional practice looped back into local space and local selves, giving 
1poets some power to temporarily deterritorialise the hujra. This kind of poetry shaped 
both subjects and institutions, and linked everyday material world-making activities like
collective harvest into the various transcendences of sainthood and of a mobile society.
This was the professional milieu Muhammad Nur inherited. Let us return to his 
biography. In oral history collected by folklorist Zalmay Hewadmal, he was conscripted 
to the army in ‘Abd al-Rahman’s reign.34 Does this allude to 1890s incursions through 
Laghman by Pashtun militias from the plains, on their way to subdue upper Alingar’s 
animist villages? In some songs Muhammad Nur identifies as a jadid, a post-animist 
new Muslim, calling direct notice to the violent edge between sovereign assimilation 
and exception. And in another, a love song, he says ‘My love, you’re a non-Muslim’s 
daughter; I may be son of Jallad (‘Executioner’) Khan the murderer; but I’ve left that 
city.’35 To conclude the oral history: after conscription the farmer Muhammad Nur 
deserted the army’s violence, retreating with his untutored poetic talent into an itinerant 
troupe of wedding singers and hujra poets. Now if poetic voice was understood to be 
collective, may we read this history of one life as also a stand-in for its transregional 
collective, a microcosm of social resilience amid the collective trauma of new territory? 
We have clues in poetic critique as to how this trauma manifested. An 
intensification of new sovereignties was inseparable from sudden forcible promotion of 
a mode of Islam that heavily emphasised the transcendence of the unitary sovereign 
God. This contrasted with the region’s equally Islamic, but devotee-centric and 
uncentralised parallel worlds—ones that devotees preserved in poetic space, even as 
other sociopolitical conditions were changing. And indeed, besides his devotee-centric 
rephrasing of sainthood, Muhammad Nur often directly argues for non-centralised 
everyday publics as a route to alternate political subjecthood, that too in counterpoint to 
1unitary modes of authority, which the Amir himself commonly phrased in idioms of 
patriarchy and paternalism.36 One song refuses this lineal idiom, and more: 
[Refrain] Some may have brought their information from the uninformed
I have brought forth my information from the archive (daftar) of the fatherless.
      * * *
God gathered up earth together–And He made Baba Adam
And out of that Baba’s earth He brought forth beautiful humanity 
There was a seed of generation–It was itself prophetic
From droplets into a cup [of dust, Adam] was brought forth with no mother 
[Ref.]
Luqman, too, was fatherless–He was of Iskandar’s race
The Lord brought him forth as the most authoritative of physicians 
All children are born to mothers–But the fatherless are dependent on no one’s heart
And some women have brought forth new life without fathers 
[Ref.]
‘Isa was a prophet–He also had a fixed presence in heaven
One Bibi Maryam brought him forth without a father 
Immersion in the Divine is brought by the Wine-Bearer–It surfaced in Mansur
Shams brought forth to the qazi [the judge, Rumi] the ashes [of his own books] 
[Ref.]
He who is ill-fated–The world is hard on him
But I have now turned the oppressors (zaliman) on their heads
He who is wise–He will be open-hearted of his own accord
Muhammad Nur has brought forth artfulness to the poets!
[Ref.] 37
This song fits into a tradition of popular poetic preaching, but in the refrain and final 
stanzas, this refusal of lineage also seems defensive—perhaps against questions of 
parentage, or against Muhammad Nur’s unusual lack of interest in having either a poetic
pedigree that he was trained in, or a retinue of his own? Or is it a more general point? In
this milieu, amid new consolidations of hierarchy, identities were growing more rigid 
and locally-rooted. Tribal lineage, along with the hierarchies of age and gender it was 
built on, constituted local politics and earned state and imperial patronage. Lineages of 
sufi allegiance, transmitted from deputy to deputy, offered possibilities of evasion but in
the practice of allegiance they created webs of hierarchy too. All these relationships 
patterned the subjective worlds of border populations in newly unequal ways and, if 
only in part, cemented individuals to fixed points in social space-time. 
1Prophetic authority, beyond temporality, is higher than fixed roots and inherited 
power. But even more than that, this poem celebrates the source of that authority and its 
presence in the historical world: an intuition that God has inspired since Adam, 
generated into the world anew each time, often through relationships with non-
normative women and men. Maryam brought forth ‘Isa, the Word of God, with no 
husband; Shams burned Rumi’s law books in order to spark the latter’s metamorphosis 
from jurist to mystic. Collating such points into an ‘archive’ of gnostic self-generation is
a move that mirrors Muhammad Nur’s unfragmented geographies, his habitation of 
multiple speaking personae, or his multilingual fluidity. In subaltern parallel to the 
experience of hayrat that Saikia describes in her contribution to this collection, this is a 
call to transcend the violence of fixity and to reground selfhood into more 
compassionate community-worlds with no specific telos. In the last stanzas Muhammad
Nur makes his connections clear: this was possible in the “open-hearted”, antihierarchic 
relationships that were organic with oral-poetic publics. Finally, though, such publics 
are also active weapons of the weak38 that can “turn oppressors on their heads”...perhaps
like, for example, when their existence helped organise shared communal labour and 
repelled imperial incursions at Hadda?
The community of Muhammad Nur imagined this world with a power to outlast 
specific hierarchies, to continuously arm subjects against elite subjectivation, and to 
ensure cultural survival. Here Muhammad Nur visualises poetic community—horizontal
community like his that did not spread through the path of master and student—as a tool
of resilience and a weapon of resistance amid dominant reorderings of the world:
[Refrain] The rotating times of the world have passed and are passing; 
The kings of the world will not remain.
* * *
They passed and are passing; but if you understand
Take a torch, fear not the pitch-black
1Don’t let yourself get dessicated in the desert of the world 
[Ref.] 
I, Muhammad Nur, made my poems painful 
And I put a hidden sword in everyone’s hand
And eventually there turned out to be no need for student-apprentices in the world
[Ref.]  39
Elsewhere, a reflexive comment by Muhammad Nur on his own communities?
... Airplanes fly in the air – They make all kinds of different noises
As automobiles drive on the roads, they conceal a lost caravan...40
It is this vision that drives my argument in the second half of this essay. ‘Hidden 
swords’ like Muhammad Nur’s weakened the threads in webs of authority that tied 
together imperial and monarchic space; even more so for the fact that his songs spread 
horizontally, without students. But as we will see, by 1920, oral-poetic ‘caravans’ 
travelled a parallel trajectory alongside other entrepreneurs, who presented their own 
positionality as universal: reformist intellectuals of a crossregional Persian and Urdu 
print sphere in urban Afghanistan, Turkistan, and India. Drawing both on international 
Persianate modernism and on nascent nationalist counter-hegemony, these webs of 
culture might also seem to marginalise rural populations at first glance. And yet, they 
were not always so separate from upland space. Yes, upland worlds were reordered amid
new political economies, and reciprocal community-making practices like ashar fell out
of custom (indeed in one song Muhammad Nur suggests that the jihads of the age 
should appropriately be directed at the deceits of the market economy and elite-centered
notions of transregional civilisation).41 But broad notions of mutuality were relocated 
into the virtual world of poetic space in an era when material antihierarchy was a fading 
memory. As the next section argues, this increased the domains of such notions: oral 
poetic ‘hidden swords’ were taken up by elite scholars who moved between rural and 
urban worlds, and were a vital part of more directly revolutionary politics.
2III: Mutuality, Multitudes, and Revolutionary Sentiment: 1910-1925
Activists like Fazl-i Mahmud Makhfi (1882-1947) mark a point where an urbane
pro-democratic Persian, Urdu and Pashto print sphere of Afghanistan, Turkistan and 
India met ideas of pan-Islam, revolutionary revivalist theology, transnational leftism, 
and an upland moral universe built with oral technologies like Muhammad Nur’s. 
What was the world into which Makhfi was born? Makhfi’s family were from the Tribal
Agency of Bajaur, but had settled in the princely Khanate of Dir; while Makhfi himself 
was raised in Charsadda, in the agrarian heart of the colonial Peshawar Valley.42 In these
revenue-producing “Settled Districts”, unlike the Tribal Areas but similar to Punjab, 
colonial rule depended on propertied grandees who possessed titles as well as 
discretionary power to collect revenue and levy local taxes. The most powerful 
landowners delegated management of their many villages to headmen of the lower 
gentry, though, many of whom felt greater solidarity with tenant farmers and labouring 
castes by this time. Unlike in Punjab, rural politics gained a distinct aura of anti-
imperial class conflict, rooted in this small gentry. Reactions against elite landed power 
sparked the rise of the Indian National Congress-allied Khudai Khidmatgar mass 
movement in the 1930s. And ‘Abd al-Rahim Popalzai, the mufti of Peshawar, was a 
communist party branch founder who organised multiple agitations in the NWFP, with 
the help of small gentry who saw the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Congress as too 
conciliatory.43 Makhfi’s example allows us, in this section, to flesh out the early history 
of these trends and link them to earlier, and wider, devotional sentiment.
Like many among the NWFP’s small gentry, Makhfi’s background straddled, 
and thus undermined, multiple zones and techniques of imperial rule; and he himself 
found new routes of mobility too. Unable to break into the landed elite, education was 
2another path for small landowners’ sons in the Peshawar Valley. Makhfi was admitted to
Peshawar’s elite Edwardes Missionary High School. However, he enrolled at Dar 
al-‘Ulum Deoband instead in 1907. By 1907 individual teachers there like Mahmud al-
Hasan (1851-1920) had built underground anticolonial networks among graduates 
across South Asia. Deoband’s struggle against local custom was echoed in Hasan’s 
milieu by wider expressions of anti-territory: folklore attached to Bengali peasant leader
‘Abd al-Hamid Bhashani (1880-1976), claims that one of Hasan’s mottoes was ‘Destroy
every existing structure’.44 Makhfi studied with Hasan, the same year as Bhashani.
On his return to NWFP, Makhfi became a leading figure at Dar al-‘Ulum Gadar, 
Mardan, the epicentre of a frontier network of around a hundred independent schools. 
These emphasised social reform, grassroots service, and Pashto-medium education, and 
the force behind the schools was Makhfi’s pir, the ‘Haji Sahib’ of Turangzai (1858-
1937). Haji Sahib himself practised a variegated politics across varied terrain to build 
devotee networks. While his miraculous reputation and his Deoband education gained 
Haji Sahib authority in frontier jihad networks, and his Settled District schools 
resonated with Indian nationalist swadeshi (self-reliance) politics, Haji Sahib was a 
khalifa, or deputy, to the Sahib of Hadda. Like the latter, he built networks through 
langar politics of reciprocity. Makhfi’s poems were organic with all these networks, and
later animated others still: at Gadar, Makhfi mentored a youth from Charsadda named 
Khan ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan, who would later become the NWFP’s pre-eminent 
political organiser in the 1930s and ’40s through his Khudai Khidmatgar mass 
movement. An ally to Gandhi and a pioneer in disciplined nonviolent resistance, the 
first page of ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan’s memoir opens with one of Makhfi’s few poems to 
survive in print.45
2Actors like Makhfi folded all-India activism into global as well as local action. 
His language skills earned him a post in 1912 as a translator at a British base in Muscat 
that policed Afghan gun-running in the Persian Gulf.46 This was ideal for Makhfi, as he 
was also a double-agent for the ‘Hizbullah’ movement, in which allies of Mahmud al-
Hasan of Deoband and journalist Maulana Abu’l-Kalam Azad (later to become president
of the Indian National Congress) built networks to Afghanistan, Germany, and the 
Ottoman Empire in hopes of forging an anticolonial bloc.47 Fazl-i Mahmud took his 
pen-name makhfī (‘hidden, anonymous’) from these commitments. By 1913, Makhfi’s 
pir Haji Sahib had set up a Hizbullah branch in the Tribal Areas to bring Turkish troops 
to train a resistance that would raid British assets.48 Amid the First Balkan War, nascent 
global pan-Islamic sentiments tracked existing networks, and the borderland presented a
dense set of pathways of scholarship, politics, pilgrimage, and trade that increasingly 
linked into global networks. In 1914, just before the plot was uncovered, Makhfi fled to 
the Tribal Areas. Using family ties and links to Haji Sahib, he helped the Indian 
mujahidin, described by Saikia in this collection, establish themselves locally. He then 
moved to Kabul in 1916 to seek the support of the Amir’s anti-British brother Nasrullah,
who was already cultivating cross-border rebel maliks (elders) and gun-runners.49
 Kabul was influential in globalising Makhfi’s thought. Both Nasrullah and 
Makhfi worked with the underground anti-imperial and anti-monarchic Constitutional 
movement. This circle of Kabuli elites pioneered a critical print sphere, infusing it, and 
Makhfi, with the positivism that inspired sections of Iran’s 1905 constitutional 
revolution, Russia’s 1905 revolution, and India’s Swadeshi movement. By 1916 the 
Movement was at its height. Finally, Makhfi kept ties in Kabul with Indian expatriates 
like pan-Islamic revolutionary ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi (1872-1944); and Mahendra Pratap 
(1886-1979) and Mawlawi Barakatullah (1854-1927) of the Ghadar Party, founded by 
2Punjabi socialists in San Francisco. Barakatullah had already worked in Tokyo and New
York and both were members of a 1915 delegation to Berlin.50 Makhfi and others like 
him tied this transnational anti-British and anti-monarchic nexus in war-era Kabul back 
to borderland militancy, amid a series of uprisings throughout the period.
Of course, most accounts of cross-border activism centre elite individuals and 
networks including those above, in narrating lineages of anti-imperialism. But one can 
invert the emphasis, as Sana Haroon’s work does, to highlight social networks and 
practices like bay’at, or allegiance, that joined cosmopolitan actors and power brokers 
of the borderlands in militancy.51 And Makhfi the poet helps us go further still in the rest
of this section, to highlight ways that channelling upland devotional affect—more 
diffuse than face-to-face allegiances, yet larger than them—infused elite activism with 
service-oriented egalitarianism. Even now Makhfi is famous, but few of his works were 
printed. Most were preserved orally, if at all.52 A contemporary, ‘Abd al-Akbar Khan 
Akbar, alludes in his memoir to Makhfi’s early participation in “qawmi musha‘ire” 
which, in the 1910s, would have been real-time oral-poetic exchanges in hujras, the 
elite men’s lodges.53 These are among the earliest harmonisations of autonomistic hujra 
space to libertarian-nationalist politics. And, Makhfi’s poetry’s content is inseparable 
from this contingent activism. In conversation with nationalist leaders, ‘Abd al-Ghaffar 
Khan’s memoir often notes, Makhfi envisioned a modern nation-state upon 
independence. But he sang of nation as hujra: the men’s lodge that served as village 
public space and that housed poetic circulation, including Makhfi’s, but also housed the 
contingent alliances of khans’  factions, dalas, that comprised upland rural politics. In 
some songs, Makhfi sees these local processes, the confluence of everyday gathering, 
politics, and poetics, as akin to political articulation of crossregional Pashtun 
multitudes:
2O Lord, may you populate and make prosperous – The hujra of our unity
Let us gather together as selves in this space –The dispersed Pashtun faction [dala]
Make as one heart, one breath, make as one – These scattered Pashtuns 
From Kashmir to Herat, distant – From Balochistan, to where we stand
They are all Pashtuns, wherever – Atomised, they may be
Make an entity – O God, of these separate atoms ... 54
The hujra metaphor was important in this era, that of NWFP Chief Commissioner 
George Roos-Keppel. Roos-Keppel’s policies aimed to defuse political reform and 
accentuate political informality by accentuating ‘Pashtun’ culture like hujras that could 
support elite khans’ face-to-face networks.55 But by now, large landowner politics were 
often absentee, focused on ties to colonial bureaucracy, while rural opposition among 
the small gentry and peasantry began remaking the village hujra. It embodied notables’ 
authority; but also other, non-state, politics too; and it now began to house popular 
oppositional organisation.56 Hujras thus became a regular site of colonial policing, as 
‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan writes.57 Other contemporaries note in memoirs that from the war
period, even mildly reformist Urdu publications like Zamindar were, in the Frontier, 
confiscated during hujra searches.58 Activist media were seldom written, then, and 
activism like Makhfi’s adapted to the forum that hujras provided: mobile and contingent
activism, unwritten poetics rather than prose. 
Afghan and imperial rule both triangulated subjects in a matrix of tribe, lineage, 
village, and other social and geographic territory. In the uplands, Muhammad Nur’s 
anonymous pathways broke these bounds of rooted location, and forged mobile publics 
as lines of flight. In Makhfi’s Settled Districts, as in more elite Afghan politics, state 
rule created inequality between those for whom roots and lineage were an advantage, 
like aristocrats or large landowners; and the rest, for whom roots and lineage were more 
ambivalent features of the social landscape. Finally, Makhfi also worked in a situation 
of physical surveillance. The embodiment, contingency, and anonymity of oral culture; 
2a slippage between the rootless/anonymous and the powerless; the reuse of anonymity 
as tactics rather than liability; and an activism in explicit defence of the powerless: in 
this context, these all complemented each other. The following is an illustrative early 
1920s song by Makhfi, at a time when Frontier activism was beginning to merge with 
that of the Indian National Congress. It calls for activism in an idiom congenial both to 
all-India politics and to popular rural preaching:
Rabba! [Lord!] Bring us love for our qawm [people; nation]; grant relief in this fire
May you bring each of our injured members the cup of love
* * *
He who spoke Divine Truth to [the despot] Nimrud
He who was unafraid of [the] Pharaoh
He who will cry out on behalf of his people on Judgement Day. 
Bring us their Islam!
Rabba! Bring us love for our qawm; grant relief amid this fire
May you bring each of our injured members the cup of love
And those with no voice to shout, they whisper secretly in their lovers’ hearts
The secrets of their hearts are like the scent of a rose. Bring us that Islam!
Rabba! Bring us love for our qawm; grant relief amid this fire
May you bring each of our injured members the cup of love 59
We must read this poem in light of Makhfi’s elite connections. He was informed by 
Afghan Constitutional nationalism; by South Asian reformist religion in Urdu mass 
print; and by publics in English, Punjabi and Urdu that were constituted by transnational
socialist print culture. And he drew on pan-Islamic Urdu print activism pioneered by his
Hizbullah comrade, the journalist and pan-Islamic activist Abu’l-Kalam Azad, discussed
by Chattopadhyay in this compilation. By the early 1930s, Azad was more responsive to
populist currents from which he had earlier segregated himself, and further evolutions 
of his thought had appeared in print: his eclectic Qur’anic exegesis derived concepts of 
rububiyat (lordship) and rahmat (mercy) into a call for social service that was also taken
up by the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. In this argument, Azad held that Islam is 
service to God; while God is both a Nurturing Lord (Rabb) and is Self-Sufficient, 
requiring no service; so true service of God involves social service by proxy: making 
2oneself a channel for God’s merciful nurturing of humanity without regard for sect, 
gender or ethnicity.60 Similar sentiments, even a quasi-Azadian lexicon, appear in 
Makhfi’s work above, especially with the refrain ‘Rabba’ used in this specific context. 
Notably, though, populism emerges in Makhfi’s songs earlier than in Azad’s 
work, even as the idea of anonymity resonates with the model of revolutionary secret 
society activism that Azad worked in during the 1910s. But returning to the primary 
point, can we link this, and Makhfi’s egalitarian songs more broadly, to sedimentations 
of earlier devotion as much as to ashraf anti-imperialism? Makhfi’s integration into 
networks like those of his pir Haji Sahib of Turangzai, and into Hadda’s by extension, 
was not just a matter of political allegiance. Outside urban constructions of Haji Sahib 
as either nationalist-reformer or outlaw-fanatic, a corpus of oral poetry is devoted to him
too as a saint.61 And while the song above was part of proto-Congress activism, for this 
same reason it shows oral-poetic worlds were now inhabiting new social domains. It 
produces revolutionary desire through devotional desire, building on the topos of the 
rose as a devotee’s paradigmatic beloved. But the song here adapts a didactic genre of 
prophetic stories that Muhammad Nur also used, to bring local action into 
eschatological space-time centred around a mass rather than a messiah. It uses a refrain 
typical of Pashto call-and-response genres to reinforce a performative ‘we’, one that 
calls for activists to speak truth to power but that also directs devotional passion into 
subaltern mutuality. And, the song links mutuality to its own poetic publics, in a way 
that echoes Muhammad Nur’s ‘hidden pathways’ of collective survival as much as 
anything else: “Those who have no voice to shout, whisper secretly in their lovers’ 
hearts; the secrets of their hearts are like the scent of a rose”. The song is by Makhfi. 
But its form reflects the participative audiences Makhfi met, who circulated and 
2preserved it beyond its initial performance. Audiences maintained slippages between 
devotional and revolutionary desire in collaboration with activists like Makhfi.
Kabul’s Constitutionalists assumed statism in their attempts at 
counterhegemony. So did the Indian National Congress. Makhfi’s work intersected with
these spheres, but was sustained by polyvocal anonymous worlds of hujra poetry. His 
activism, like Mahmud al-Hasan’s call to deconstruct all structures, wrested space away 
from empire, monarchy, and elite nationalism, more than it aimed to consolidate 
specific gains. Its emphasis was process, not telos; and it grounded its process in the 
hujra’s everyday space, organic with casual and contingent local organisation rather 
than with the abstract space of nation. In this, Makhfi diverged even from the 
metropolitan Indian left. Even as its revolutionary force intersected with tribal-agency 
mobilisations, Makhfi’s poetry, echoing its ephemeral pathways of hujra circulation, 
sought survival in the space of oral whispers.
IV: Between Court and Multitude, an Ethics of Mutuality: 1919-1928
Of course the afterlives of upland worlds did not affect only one side of the border. In 
Afghanistan, as this final section argues, the 1920s saw a far more systematic 
development of similar ideas of anti-state mutuality, and from within the heart of an 
emergent nationalist state itself. This is not unexpected: individual cross-border activists
including Makhfi gained ground in Kabul in the 1920s, but that decade saw a net dis-
articulation of cross-border activism and a rise in a sense of territory, geographic and 
social, that was yet more rooted in states than previously. In the colonial sphere, 
bureaucratic control in the frontier increased, while senses of newly-elaborate territory 
were subtler in Afghanistan. I describe this new wave of Afghan territorialisation below,
before discussing its subversion.
2With Amir Habibullah’s 1919 assassination, his son and successor Amanullah 
sought court allies in a struggle against his uncle Nasrullah, and adopted the 
Constitutionalist project of elite modernisation and ceremonial nation-building. Persian 
modernism in a centralised system was still the state’s primary mode of cultural power; 
but if elite nationalists, Pashtun or otherwise, preferred an institutional nation-state to 
messy hujra politics, Amanullah’s other agenda appealed to constitutionalists, 
transnational activists like Makhfi, rural power brokers, and Tribal Agency mujahidin 
alike: full independence from British India. In May of 1919, just after the end of World 
War I, Amanullah declared jihad against the British empire. It lasted a few months with 
limited casualties. The empire ended its subsidy to the Afghan court, and relinquished 
control over Afghan foreign affairs in exchange for official reaffirmation of the border. 
But to Amanullah the war was not just a state affair; it was a chance to consolidate 
national hegemony. It was partly fought by army regulars, led by some of the same 
elites who spearheaded the Constitutional Movement.62 But Amanullah also relied on 
irregulars, organised by familiar solidarities: just before the war, a group of khans, 
‘ulama, and other elites of the Eastern Province met at the Sahib of Hadda’s grave in 
1919 and signed a pact to liberate the Afghan crown from the British empire. Royal 
negotiations with rural power were replicated in Pashto print too. The weekly paper 
Ittihad-i Mashriqi (‘Unity of the Eastern Provinces’) was launched in 1920 on the 
anniversary of the above meeting, to remind the participants, and the broader society, of 
their contract with their independent, legitimate Afghan crown. The first issue printed 
Amanullah’s farman declaring jihad and authorising tribal leaders’ battle standards. It 
described royal gifts like rifles engraved with tribes’ name, their leaders’ name, and the 
jihad front where they fought.63 The paper was an icon of elite monarchic consensus, 
and of indirect rule that was mutual with local internalisations of hierarchised tribe. 
2But in less guarded expression within Amanullah’s state, monarchy and rural 
society negotiated differently. The products of contingent encounters were often a 
synergy of rural and urban lines of flight: of Persianate modernism, European 
liberalism, and Pashto oral critique. In such encounters, which had to be commonplace 
even if sources attesting to them are now rare, we see not statist inscriptions of territory 
but rather a radically egalitarian vision of individual self-realization through reciprocal 
social relations. One source that survives is a privately-held document that the scholar 
‘Abd al-Hayy Habibi dates to 1925, a versified sermon by court jurist Mawlawi ‘Abd 
al-Wasi‘ Qandahari (1873-1929) that we will come to shortly. 
Mawlawi Wasi‘ had been a Constitutionalist Movement leader. Under 
Amanullah he went on to work with Turkish jurists in building the first Afghan 
constitution, heavily influenced by the French model. He was the authority who signed 
most of Amanullah’s nizamnamas, or legislative edicts, and he delivered the Friday 
sermon at Kabul’s Pul-i Khishti mosque.64 While most of ‘Abd al-Wasi‘s preserved 
work is Persian legal prose, the 1925 poem shows his mastery of Pashto as performed 
rhetoric, in the popular idiom of versified sermons. A long argument phrased as a poetic 
meditation on the Qur’anic verse Wa ta‘awanu ‘ala ’l-birri wa ’ t-taqwa (Cooperate 
unto piety and righteousness), Wasi‘ composed this sermon one year after the 1924 
Khost Uprising: a border insurgency led by khans and clerics that was the first serious 
challenge to Amanullah’s state. The unrest was sparked by a sudden rise of patronage 
channels—corruption among state officials—that new enforcement of institutions like 
land tax, private property, and mandatory military service brought even to remote rural 
areas.65 Mawlawi Wasi‘ was sent as a chief negotiator for the state in talks with the 
uprising’s leaders. And lines in Wasi‘s poem about corruption among khans and mullas 
could reference events that aggravated the uprising.
3The poem begins with a modern iteration of concepts from the Persianate 
discipline of ethics, akhlaq, that informed seventeenth century Mughal court scholars’ 
social-theoretical texts. Wasi‘ posits that social fractiousness is mutually-constitutive 
with weakness of the reflective conscience (wujdan) that balances individuals’ 
psychological impulses. In the middle section, Wasi‘ illustrates this thesis with a 
hypothetical village dystopia of individual self-interest and corruption in a competitive, 
‘tribal’ Pashtun countryside: a sideways critique of local everyday-state corruption and a
stereotyped politics of ‘tribe’ (qabila) driven by competitive masculinity; and as we 
saw, Amanullah’s state itself reinforced tribe and localism among rural populations. 
Wasi‘ may not have made those connections explicit, but as a rural land-grantee 
himself, he surely understood the conflicts arising amid new elaborations of social and 
geographic territory. In any event, while the first part of the poem expands on classical 
ethical concepts, this middle portion expands on a Pashto proverb to underscore local 
relevance: ‘Even if my father owns the village mill, I wait my turn like everyone’. The 
sermon argues that social, economic and political life cannot be separated; and calls for 
the mutuality of local non-market political economy to be the basis of society. Finally, 
the last lines fold the local back into a utopian vision of mutual collective subjectivity, 
achieved through a mirror of collective self-reflection:
... Everyone has a sort of mirror in their home 
But it’s covered in rust and tarnish ... 
What is this rust but self-interested ego, 
That makes this one into ‘Lord’; me into ‘Akhund’; she, into ‘Lady’ ... 
If the idea of harmonious cooperation is ever let loose upon the world 
Then it’s clear that all persons will become nobility (khawas) ... 
In all of our houses there is an old mirror 
The rust can’t harm it; it is clear underneath ... 
Come! Let’s place it atop the crossroads 
And the whole world will see it from the four directions ... 
There will be universal harmony [sulh-i kull]
Everyone’s benefit and injury will be clear for all to see 
The winners and losers will be visible 
Our place will be filled with the exercise of cooperation 
Each individual will be resplendent. 66
3In this public address, the court jurist Mawlawi Wasi‘ adapts early modern Persianate 
ideas including sulh-i kull, ‘universal harmony’, to new politics. In the philosophy that 
Wasi‘ had studied, this concept described a resubjectivation of society, made possible 
when Divine Radiance was refracted through the ruler’s faculty of rational balance, and 
outward into society where it ordered the psychologies of other individuals through 
balanced, just rule.67 But to Wasi‘, psychology and social harmony are not part of a 
monarch-centred ordering of the cosmos. Nor, for that matter, are individuals pre-
formed, with liberty to be safeguarded by states, as was assumed by the liberal 
constitutionalism that patterned Wasi‘s written work. The rise of the everyday state in 
Khost fuelled atomised competition; Wasi‘s solution is an alternate source of akhlaq 
that enables a mutualist political economy. Instead of divine light, individuals are 
realised through the recovery of a self-reflective mutuality found in “our houses”: 
Afghans’ own mirror of conscience that enables everyone to see each other. Planted in 
the collective macrocosm of the common crossroads, the mirror creates new space in the
world as it projects the radiance of popular empowerment: not the abstract space of 
‘society’ or ‘nation’ that look to monistic sovereignty, but that of a radical equality that 
ennobles all men and women of a global multitude. For Wasi‘, this is sulh-i kull. 
I can only speculate; but did ‘Abd al-Wasi‘s inversions of imperial and 
constitutional statism sit in dialogue with sympathetic visions we have seen elsewhere? 
Wasi‘ composed a verse sermon, parts of it in a rural style, not long after protracted 
negotiations with leaders of the Khost uprising. Besides the fact that he must have 
engaged local grievances, another voice on Amanullah’s behalf alongside Wasi‘ was 
Haji Sahib of Turangzai, Makhfi’s pir whom we met earlier. A devotee of the Sahib of 
3Hadda and a chief inheritor of the Hadda milieu in the Tribal Areas, the Haji Sahib 
travelled to the negotiations with a number of his own Afghan devotees.68 
Whether such interjections of radical mutuality at the centre of the state foretold 
future change is also hard to say. In 1928 a commoner and former military subaltern of 
Kabul’s exurbs, Habibullah Kalakani, led the latest in a series of peasant rebellions, one 
suffused with even more militant rhetoric of social levelling. The monarchy was 
overthrown, and many within the old order, including Wasi‘, were summarily executed.
Conclusion
In presenting three individuals, I do not intend to centre their individual innovations. 
Nor do I mean to suggest direct ties between Muhammad Nur, Makhfi, and ‘Abd al-
Wasi‘. Their lifetimes overlapped. Makhfi and Muhammad Nur were both devotees in a 
wider Hadda network. Makhfi and Wasi‘ perhaps knew each other; they shared urban 
colleagues in the Afghan Constitutional Movement, and borderland associates like Haji 
Sahib of Turangzai, again tied to Hadda. But rather than playing up such links, I present 
these actors as tokens in what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizomic analysis, explicitly 
in contrast to a linear one: tracing subterranean migrations and metamorphoses of a 
particular orientation to social, political and religious life across mostly disconnected 
sproutings in society, and in microcosm within individual activists’ variable work.69 
In this, my poetic account of border sufism contrasts with, for example, Sana Haroon’s 
in Frontier of Faith, which is rooted in the colonial archive and tracks state concerns: 
elite brokerage and face-to-face webs of allegiance. It also contrasts to views that 
narrate militancy only as reaction to processes of empire. These are both important 
factors, but in neglecting emic histories one risks reinscribing imperial violence and also
misses important lineages of politics in histories that have been considered well-studied.
3To summarise: devotee geographies, involving practices of collective selfhood 
as much as political brokerage, and physically embodied in pilgrimage and harvest, had 
long been integral to upland life. By 1900 the power of these social domains 
recontextualised the role of brokers like Sahib of Hadda, as new modes of sovereign 
authority violently fragmented the landscape and devotees were led to self-reflexively 
define, and defend, autonomous alter-worlds in the virtual spaces of text. Meanwhile, 
overlaps in the practice of upland poets, border ‘ulama, and elites closer to state power 
lent Muhammad Nur, Makhfi, and Wasi‘ overlapping idioms and audiences, complete 
with shared preoccupations and emphases. As a result, all these spaces mutually 
deterritorialised each other; while desires for social levelling, nurtured in devotional 
worlds, became more elaborate as they emerged in rapidly-shifting oppositional politics 
further afield. Even if actors like Makhfi and Wasi‘ were committed to statism in some 
contexts, their lives were patterned by such sentiments and in some contexts they came 
to promote, even reflexively articulate, something like what Maia Ramnath has called 
‘small-a anarchism’:
a recurrent tendency or orientation—with stress on movement in a direction, not a 
perfected condition—toward more dispersed and less concentrated power; less top-
down hierarchy and more self-determination through bottom-up participation...and 
nurturance of individuality and diversity within a matrix of interconnectivity, 
mutuality, and accountability.70
This has been, in short, an account of the rise of an alternate-modern reflexive political 
practice, albeit an account derived from Muhammad Nur’s interpretive frame: his 
positing of hidden streams of anticentralised communitarian social relations within 
hierarchic systems, and his distrust of lineal historiography. Rather than tracing lineages
of cosmopolitan reformism, and their transposition to the rural frontier, I see such ideas 
as resonant with embodied knowledge like that of Muhammad Nur’s public, that 
3developed within long histories of resilience in a globally subalternised region. But 
returning to our introduction, even in displacing a lineal ideation-centred discussion, it 
is vital to address the reflexivity emergent in these spaces: to emphasise the dynamism 
of a society that is imagined by policymakers even now, as much as in the era of British 
empire, as isolated, ‘inward-looking,’ and trapped in ‘tribal’ frames of reference.71
This raises questions for us today, as yet newer modes of violence expand 
through Khyber. As Manan Ahmed Asif argues, a view of frontiers as a lawless tribal 
terra nullius undergirds imperial policy in the US-led moment.72 And Derek Gregory 
explores how the ‘shadowland’ of global frontiers—zones of exclusion where 
transnational force meets flexible legality—now suffuse ever-wider swathes of social 
space near the metropole.73 In an afterthought Gregory raises the hope of ‘contrapuntal’ 
geographies but does not draw out what this might look like, apart from a fear that 
groups like the Taliban may be the most predictable result.74 This critique is vital, but it 
has far outstripped any imagination of alternatives. Might not scholarship reinscribe the 
same violence it describes, if even critical academics have difficulty imagining the 
area’s own embattled yet still living cosmologies? Certainly much of the Taliban’s 
appeal is that of social levelling and anti-statism, much like the above. In an era of 
global securitisation, outsourced state functions, commoditised religion, market 
economy, and no direct memory of reciprocal customs of social cohesion like ashar, it is
an easy manoeuvre to maintain social levelling while replacing mutuality with yet more 
exclusion and domination. But Muhammad Nur, singing at an exact point of transition 
when poetic knowledge became disembodied but became more mobile and more potent 
for it, alerts us to the possibility that ‘lost caravans’ might carry on in the face of all the 
above. 
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